Mathematical Model of Computer Viruses



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

- Models of computation
- Operating system
- Virus definition
- What can we do with this mathematical model ?

Turing Machine

Turing Machine

VESZPROG

Finite automata



Turing Machine

VESZPROG

Finite automata



Input tape



Turing Machine

Finite automata



Output tape



Input tape



Turing Machine

$T = < Q, S, I, \delta, b, q_0, q_f >$

VESZPROG

S: tape symbols

I: input symbols, $I \subset S$

b: blank symbol, $b \in S \setminus I$

δ: move function, $\delta: Q \times S \rightarrow Q \times S \times \{l, r, s\}$




Random
Access
Machine
Output tape
VESZPROG
Memory
41256
80486
DX4
Input tape
CPU & Program

Random Access Machine




RASPM
Output tape
Memory
(Program)
41256
80486
DX4
Input tape
CPU
VESZPROG

RASPM with ABS



RASPM with SABS



RASPM with ABS definition

$G = \langle V, U, T, f, q, M \rangle$

M: initial memory content

q: initial value of the IP

$f: U \rightarrow T$

T: set of processor's activities

U: operation codes, $U \subseteq V$

V: set of symbols

Instruction set

- move (LOAD, STORE)
- logical (AND, OR, XOR)
- arithmetic (ADD, SUB, MULT, DIV)
- branch (JUMP, JGTZ, JZERO)
- input/output tape handling (READ, WRITE)
- background tape handling (GET, PUT, SEEK, SETDRIVE)

Operating System

Operating System

- system of programs

Operating System



- system of programs
- able to handle separate program or data files

Operating System

- system of programs
- able to handle separate program or data files
- able to make a specified program to run.

Operating Systems under RASPM with ABS



Operating Systems under RASPM with ABS



- The OS is in the initial memory (M)

Operating Systems under RASPM with ABS



- The OS is in the initial memory (M)
  → OS specific machine

Operating Systems under RASPM with ABS



- The OS is in the initial memory (M)
  → OS specific machine
- The OS is in the background tape

Operating Systems under RASPM with ABS



- The OS is in the initial memory (M)
  → OS specific machine
- The OS is in the background tape
  → OS independent machine

Operating Systems under RASPM with ABS



- The OS is in the initial memory (M)
  → OS specific machine
- The OS is in the background tape
  → OS independent machine
- The OS is in the input tape

Operating Systems under RASPM with ABS



- The OS is in the initial memory (M)
  → OS specific machine
- The OS is in the background tape
  → OS independent machine
- The OS is in the input tape
  → unusable

Operating Systems under RASPM with ABS

- The OS is in the initial memory (M)
  → OS specific machine
- The OS is in the background tape
  → OS independent machine
- The OS is in the input tape
  → unusable

Sample OS

Comparing RASPM with ABS-es



$G_1 = \langle V_1, U_1, T_1, f_1, q_1, M_1 \rangle$

$G_2 = \langle V_2, U_2, T_2, f_2, q_2, M_2 \rangle$

Comparing RASPM with ABS-es



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$\{q_1, M_1\} \neq \{q_2, M_2\}$

Comparing RASPM with ABS-es



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$\{q_1, M_1\} \neq \{q_2, M_2\}$

- different operating systems
- different loader program

Comparing RASPM with ABS-es



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

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Comparing RASPM with ABS-es



$$G_1=<V_1,U_1,T_1,f_1,q_1,M_1>$$
$$G_2=<V_2,U_2,T_2,f_2,q_2,M_2>$$

$$\{f_1,T_1,U_1\} \neq \{f_2,T_2,U_2\}$$

- different activities
- different operation codes

Comparing RASPM with ABS-es



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

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$V_1 \neq V_2$

Comparing RASPM with ABS-es



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$V_1 \neq V_2$

- different symbols
- different tape formats

Computer virus

Computer virus

- a (part of) program

Computer virus

- a (part of) program
- it is attached to a program area

Computer virus



- a (part of) program
- it is attached to a program area
- it is able to link itself to other program areas

Computer virus



- a (part of) program
- it is attached to a program area
- it is able to link itself to other program areas
- it is executed when the host program area is to be executed

Virus spreading modes

Virus spreading modes

- machine specific

Virus spreading modes

- machine specific
- machine independent

Virus spreading modes

- machine specific
- machine independent
- operating system specific

Virus spreading modes

- machine specific
- machine independent
- operating system specific
- operating system independent

Virus spreading modes



- machine specific
- machine independent
- operating system specific
- operating system independent
- direct

Virus spreading modes

- machine specific
- machine independent
- operating system specific
- operating system independent

- direct
- indirect

Virus spreading modes



- machine specific
- machine independent
- operating system specific
- operating system independent

- direct
- indirect

Sample virus

What can we do with this mathematical model ?



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

- Examine the working mechanism of viruses

What can we do with this mathematical model ?



- Examine the working mechanism of viruses
- Examine the virus detection problem

What can we do with this mathematical model ?



- Examine the working mechanism of viruses
- Examine the virus detection problem
- Examine multiplatform viruses

General virus detection problem



Theorem:

It is impossible to build a Turing Machine which could decide if an executable file in a RASPM with ABS contains a virus or not.

General virus detection problem

Proof:



General virus detection problem

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

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

General virus detection problem

VESZPROG

Proof:



General virus detection problem

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

General virus detection problem

Proof:



Virus detection problem ⇒ TM halting problem

Multiplatform viruses



$$G_1 = \langle V_1, U_1, T_1, f_1, q_1, M_1 \rangle$$

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

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Conditions:

$$V_1 \pitchfork U_2 \neq 0$$
$$U_1 \pitchfork V_2 \neq 0$$

G_1 has to know some operation codes of G_2
G_2 has to know some operation codes of G_1

Multiplatform viruses



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- The virus code can be the same.

Multiplatform viruses



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$U_1 \cap U_2 = 0$

- The virus code must be different.

Future

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

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  - Limit the time/space

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

- Examine general virus detection problem in limited cases:
  - Spreading under the model
  - Limit the time/space
- Examine polymorphic techniques
  - Without coding/decoding
  - Changing instructions


VESZPROG


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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Searching technique questions



Searching technique questions

- For what kind of viruses can be used ?

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

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

- For what kind of viruses can be used ?
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- What is the expense criteria ?

Sequence searching algorithm

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- for non-polymorphic known viruses

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L: size of suspicious area
M: number of sequences
N: size of a sequence
n: number of values in one cell

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- for non-polymorphic known viruses
- false alarms: $p \approx \frac{L \cdot M}{n^N}$
- expense criteria: P, polynomial

$\leq L \cdot M \cdot N$ comparisions

“Heuristic” algorithm

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

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

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

How can we measure the power of polymorphism ?



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

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

$$\alpha = \frac{\text{size of variable parts of the virus}}{\text{full size of the virus}}$$

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

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β = number of variants of the decoders

Flowchart of a virus

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

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

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

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

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

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

Name: RIPPER
Aliases: Jack Ripper
Status: Common
Origin: Norway
Length: 1024 bytes (2 sectors)
Infect: MBR, Boot sector
Other: Resident, Stealth, Disk corruption



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

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- Examine the virus detection problem
- Examine multiplatform viruses

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

- Examine the working mechanism of viruses
- Examine the virus detection problem
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- Examine new polymorphic virus types